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Abstract: This paper develops a discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts to 
study race/gender differences in labor market outcomes. We find that based on the model: 
first, minority workers have a higher unemployment rate and a longer duration of unemployment; 
second,  non-discriminating firms make higher profits than discriminating firms; third, the lowest 
acceptable wage for a minority worker is greater than that for a majority worker while the highest 
expected wage of a minority worker is lower; fourth, generally, on average minority workers earn less 
than majority workers  and their wage increases more slowly than their counterparts’. In addition, our 
estimates show that productivity differences between blacks and whites (men and women) are 3% of 
whites (men’s) productivity, while 91% of firms are prejudiced towards black workers and 93% 
towards female workers. The distaste they hold toward blacks is about 70% of the productivity of 
whites and towards women it is 95% of male productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
Race and gender differentials in the labor market are persistent and widespread.  The black-white pay gap 
has remained around 20% since the mid-1970s (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Even after controlling for 
human capital and other factors, blacks still earn about 10% less than whites on average (Lang and 
Lehmann, 2010).1 In addition to wage differentials, blacks have historically higher unemployment rates 
and longer unemployment duration (Fairlie and Sundstrom, 1999). Similar stylized facts are also found in 
the gender literature. A series of papers by Blau and Kahn (2000, 2003, 2006) find that the gender pay 
gap in the US has stayed roughly constant at 25% since the mid-1990s; they also find that on average, 
there is a 0.3 log-point differential for 22 countries examined over the 1985-94 period. Gender differences 
in unemployment are also widely observed. For example, Azmat, Guell and Manning (2006) document a 
large gender gap in unemployment rates in many OECD countries. 2 Du and Dong (2009) find longer 
unemployment durations for women in post-restructuring urban China while Ollikainen (2003) observes 
longer duration for men in Finland.  
One possible explanation for these race and gender differences in labor market outcomes is the 
presence of differences in endowments of characteristics related to productivity and preferences. The 
unexplained part, on the other hand, is either due to unobserved productivity skills or discrimination in 
the labor market. However, distinguishing between the two effects   is far from straightforward. Recently, 
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) developed an equilibrium search model and separately identified 
discrimination from unobserved productivity differences because each factor affects the earnings 
distribution differently. Using a sample of male high school graduates, they find that blacks produce 3.3% 
lower than whites, and 56% of firms in the labor market have a prejudice against blacks that the distaste is 
as high as 31% of the productivity of whites. In a study of gender discrimination, Flabbi (2010) uses 
                                                            
1 Neal and Johnson (1996) find the unexplained wage gap between blacks and whites is significantly narrowed, or 
even disappeared in some subgroups after controlling for AFQT. However, other researchers find wage differentials 
re-emerge when years of schooling are further controlled with AFQT (Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996).   
2 Altonji and Blank (1999), however, find the unemployment among women has been as low or lower than among 
men since early 1980s. Participation rates, on the other hand, are historically lower among women. Therefore, when 
it comes to the overall rate of non-employment, it is always higher among women.      
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maximum likelihood estimation in a search framework with matching and bargaining and concludes that 
female workers are 6.5% less productive than male workers and that half of employers discriminate 
against women. This paper, built on the framework of search model with wage-tenure contracts (see for 
example, Burdett and Coles 2003), is able to empirically distinguish discrimination from unobserved 
productivity differences, and at the same time touches on wage-tenure profiles. Few papers on 
discrimination theory have attempted to generate predictions in this regard.3  
In what follows, we will outline a discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts and 
describe equilibrium results. To discuss the effect of discrimination on labor market outcomes, we 
introduce two types of workers and firms: (1) majority workers   and minority workers   ; (2) 
discriminating firms   and non-discriminating firms .4 Workers are assumed to be identical except for 
their appearance. Firms who experience a disutility from hiring minority workers recruit them at a slower 
rate. So, for type   workers firms are homogenous while for type   workers they are heterogeneous. In 
this paper, discrimination is associated with 3 parameters:  the fraction of  -firms, the degree of 
recruiting discrimination and the disutility taste  -firms have when hiring  -workers, all of which are 
assumed to be exogenously determined. Our model belongs to a class of random search models. Firms 
post tenure-based contracts for both types of workers, recruit workers and pay wages specified in the 
contracts. Workers, both unemployed and employed search for jobs randomly, accept the offers which 
arrive at an exogenous rate if and only if the expected lifetime value from the new offer is higher than the 
current one. Firms cannot fire workers or counter-offer workers’ outside offers.  
In equilibrium, the optimal contract for    workers provided by  -firms is uniformly better than 
that provided by  -firms. Though by offering a higher tenure-wages, the  -firm extracts a lower profit 
                                                            
3 The positive effect of tenure on wages has been identified in many studies (Altonji and Shakotko 1987; Topel 1991; 
Altonji and Williams 2005). However, there is competing empirical evidence on gender disparity in wage returns to 
tenure/experience. Some find that the overall wage return to tenure/experience is lower for women than men (Light 
and Ureta 1995; Munasinghe et al. 2008), while others find steeper wage-tenure profiles for women than men 
(Becker and Lindsay 1994; Hersch and Reagan 1997). The difference in returns to tenure between races is found to 
be insignificant in Bratsberg and Terrell (1998) and the returns to actual experience lower for blacks. 
4One can think majority and minority workers are male and female in the context of gender, or white and black in 
the context of race.  
4 
 
from each    worker, it can hire more   workers who are willing to stay for a longer period so that the 
total profit   workers have created in the   firm exceeds that in a   firm. In addition, since both firms 
make the same profit from type   workers, the total profit is also higher for   firms than   firms.  
The second finding of the discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts concerns the 
relationship between the discrimination associated parameters and wage ranges for minority workers. It 
proves that, the fewer   firms are in the labor market, the higher the minimum wage and the lower the 
maximum wage   workers can expect in   firms. Similarly, the more severe the recruiting discrimination 
or distaste   firms hold, the higher the lower bound and the lower the upper bound for wages in   firms. 
The maximum wage in  -firms, is negatively related to all three parameters.  
We also find that the lowest wage   workers are willing to accept is smaller than a   worker’s 
lowest acceptable wage and both lowest wages are smaller than the unemployment insurance. This is 
because   workers can expect a faster wage increase and a larger probability of receiving a new offer than 
  workers and at the same time, both types of employed workers get a wage promotion that the 
unemployed do not get. The sign of the mean wage gap between type   and   workers, however, is 
uncertain. If   firms don’t hire any   workers, it is shown that the average   worker earns more than the 
average   worker while in a general case,the fraction of discriminating firms and their distaste towards 
minority workers have to be large enough to generate the stylized average wage gap.   
Subsequently, we show that in a special case of a CRRA utility function with the coefficient 
approaching zero, the model degenerates to a simplified version of Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and has 
certain similar implications. How the average wage is affected by the discrimination-related parameters is 
next illustrated in the numerical example, where we also simulate the profile of wage dynamics for both 
types of workers. It is found that, the wage-tenure effect is positive and it is steeper for   workers than   
worker in most cases. 
Applying the search discrimination model with wage-tenure contracts using a sample of male 
high school graduates in 1985-88, we find that the productivity of blacks is 3% lower than that of whites 
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and that 91% of firms in the labor market possess a distaste against blacks which is as high as 71% of the 
productivity of whites. In a second application using white high school graduates, we find that the gender 
difference in productivity is 3% and there are 93% of firms with a strong distaste against female workers 
which is about 95% of men’s productivity. We compare the empirical hourly wage increase over a year 
with the predicted profiles and observe a certain correspondence between the two. 
The contribution of this paper is the development of a discrimination search model with wage-
tenure contracts that, among other things, generates race/gender differences in unemployment rates, 
durations of unemployment, and wage dynamics. In the theoretical literature on labor market 
discrimination, the taste-based theory of discrimination (Becker, 1971) and statistical discrimination 
(Aigner and Cain, 1977) are often subject to criticism on the grounds that discrimination cannot be 
sustained in the long run.5 Taste discrimination models within a search framework, on the other hand, are 
very promising in explaining persistent wage differentials (Altonji and Blank, 1999). An early example is 
Black (1995) who studied discrimination in an equilibrium search model. In that paper, cost is introduced 
in job search processes and discriminating firms are assumed to hire only majority workers. He shows in 
the model that the wage minority workers receive is lower than the wage of their majority counterparts 
and the wage differential increases with the proportion of minority workers in the labor market. In a 
similar line of research, Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), by allowing for on-the-job search, construct a 
discrimination search model that generates wage dispersion among equally productive workers (see also 
Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). Moreover, they are able to distinguish the skill differences and 
discrimination in explaining the residual wage differentials between races. This paper follows the 
assumption of on-the-job search, but replaces the constant wage assumption with wage-tenure contracts 
which was first introduced in Burdett and Coles (2003). It allows for the possibility to predict differences 
in wage-tenure profiles.   
                                                            
5
See Cain (1986) for a good review on the classic theories, Lang and Lehmann (2010) and Charles and Guryan 
(2011) for a recent review on progresses in both theories and empirics on race discrimination. 
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The next section sets up the model and discusses workers’ and firms’ optimal decisions. Section 3 
characterizes the equilibrium solutions and section 4 shows the equilibrium properties. In section 5, we 
show in a special case, that the optimal wage-tenure contracts degenerate to a constant wage and our 
discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts degenerates to a variant of Bowlus and Eckstein 
(2002). Further, to facilitate comparisons of average wages and their dynamics, we carry out a numerical 
exercise in section 6. Sections 7 and 8 put the model to data and estimate the race/gender differences in 
productivity and race/gender discrimination in the labor market. Finally, section 9 concludes and points 
out promising future research. All proofs are given in the appendix.   
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 The Environment 
Consider an economy consisting of two types of workers and firms. The total work force is    of which 
the majority workers (type  ) are        and the minority workers (type  ) are   .  Among all the 
firms in the labor market, a fraction σ has a distaste for minority workers, denoted by ; and (1-σ) are 
non-discriminating firms denoted by  . Workers are assumed to be equally productive (productivity level 
    and have utility function     , where           . They are finitely lived, with a death rate  . To 
balance the population, it’s assumed that birth rate equals death rate and the newly born people enter the 
labor force immediately as unemployed. Unemployed workers can obtain an insurance compensation   
per instant. Workers--both employed and unemployed--search for better opportunities to maximize their 
expected lifetime utility. 
On the other hand, a firm posts a wage-tenure contract and hires workers to maximize its profit. 
The wage-tenure contract is denoted by     , where   denotes tenure—the duration a worker  stays in the 
firm. Suppose the offer arrival rate is   for  -workers, both employed and unemployed; while for  -
workers, it depends on the type of firm the offer originates from. If it is from   firms, the arrival rate is 
still  ; if it is from   firms, the offer arrival rate is       , where         reflects the degree of 
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recruiting discrimination. 6  The larger   is, the more severe the discrimination.   firms experience a 
disutility   from hiring  workers, which enters the profit function directly. Therefore, the instantaneous 
profit from a   worker who has stayed in the   firm for a duration   is:     
      . In addition, 
assume firms cannot fire workers but workers can quit for a better job without suffering any punishment 
from the previous employer. Time preferences of workers and firms are zero and there are no recalls in 
the process.  
2.2 Workers’ Optimal Decision 
Let        
    be the expected lifetime utility of a type   (     ) worker who has tenure   under the 
wage-tenure contract    
   and uses an optimal quit strategy in the future. The term   
   denotes the wage-
tenure contract a type   worker has signed with firm   (     ).       ,   
      and   
       are the 
offer distributions for   and   where superscripts  ,   denote non-discriminating and discriminating 
firms and    is the starting expected lifetime value of the offer. Thus, the offer distribution measures the 
proportion of firms who provide workers a starting offer value no greater than   . Since all firms treat   
the same, there is no difference in the offer distributions for   provided by   or  firms. Let   (       
denote the infimum (supremum) of the support of    and    
 
 (  
   ) the infimum (supremum) of the support 
of   
 
 where      . 
First consider the situation of employed workers. The standard Bellman equations for employed 
type   and type   workers are: 
                                           
      
        
 
         
  
                        (1a) 
                   
                             
        
      
  
     
       
   
  
                                                            
6Parameter   can also be interpreted as indicating the difference in search intensity. Therefore, it only reflects the 
degree of recruiting discrimination when we assume both types of workers exert the same level of effort in looking 
for jobs. Indeed, the existence of recruiting discrimination against minority workers such as blacks and women are 
widely documented (see, for example, Goldin and Rouse 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; and Pager et al. 
2009). 
8 
 
                                 
        
     
  
    
       
   
 
        
   
  
                         (1b)                    
Note that, an   worker receives an offer at rate    whereas a  worker has a probability of 
       receiving an offer from   firms and a probability of         receiving an offer from   firms. 
The optimal quit strategy implies that they will quit and accept the new offer if and only if its starting 
value is greater than the current value.7 The last term in both equations calculates the instantaneous 
change in the expected lifetime value.  
Similarly, we can get the Bellman equations for unemployed workers of both types:  
                             
  
   
                                                                           (2a)                                               
                              
      
  
     
   
                    
     
  
    
   
      (2b)                
The expected lifetime value of an offer from firms should be no less than the unemployed lifetime value 
  ; otherwise, no worker would be hired. Therefore,        and    
 
     (   ,   . 
2.3 Firms’ Optimal Decision 
The optimization problem faced by a firm is to choose two wage-tenure contracts, one for   workers and 
the other for   workers, to maximize the total expected profit at the steady state. To begin with, we need 
to derive the expressions of total expected profit for each firm. 
Since the quit rate of a type   worker who has stayed   periods under the wage-tenure contract 
      is                 , the survival probability of such a worker is: 
                                    
 
 
                                                            (3a)   
Similarly, the survival probability of worker   is:  
       
                        
         
                  
         
      
 
 
    
                                                            
7
Since the relationship between the current expected lifetime value and the supremum of offers from  ( )-firm is 
not clear yet, the maximum of zero and instantaneous change that occurs when the worker accepts the offer ensures 
the non-negativity and economic meaning. Intuitively, the current value should always be smaller than   
    , which 
means the first     is trivial; however, it may or may not be smaller than   
    which makes the second     
indispensable.      
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     (3b)   
Let       denote the steady state proportion of   workers who have an expected lifetime utility 
less than or equal to   (including the unemployed); and correspondingly,       for worker  . Thus, at 
the steady state, a firm posting an offer   can recruit                   workers and          (if  -
firm) or               (if   firm)   workers. The steady state profits of   and   firms are then 
functions of the wage-tenure contracts: 
     
     
         
      
                          
 
 
         
            
        
     
 
 
           (4a) 
     
     
     
      
                          
 
 
              
            
        
       
 
 
      ( 4 b )                                                                                                                                                            
In each equation, the first part is the profit from   and the second part is the profit from  . The 
integration calculates the expected profit that each worker brings to the firm; the part before the 
integration measures the steady state number of workers hired at given offers. So, the multiplication 
reflects the firms’ expected profit from each type of worker. As both firms treat   equally, profit earned 
from   is the same between firms in equilibrium. 
To derive the optimal decisions of firms, we need to solve the profit maximization problems. Due 
to additivity, we can solve separately for  ;   in   firms and   in   firms. Each sub-problem can be 
solved in two steps:  
(i) Conditional on the offer chosen, the optimal wage-tenure contract solves: 
   
  
    
        
        
     
 
 
   
s.t         
    satisfies (3) 
           
    satisfies (1)  
        and,        
             
      
  
 . 
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(ii) The optimal offer solves: 
            
           
        
     
 
 
    
s.t  
     solves (i)  
where      ;        
When it comes to type   workers in   firms, the disutility taste   should be further subtracted from   
     .  
3 Equilibrium 
Since worker   faces homogenous firms in the labor market, the market equilibrium outcomes for this 
sub-problem are exactly the same as specified in Burdett and Coles (2003). To solve for the steady state 
equilibrium for worker  , we first show in proposition 3.2 that the optimal offer for   provided by   
firms is uniformly smaller than that provided by  -firms.  
Proposition 1: Let    
  denote the optimal offer for   given by  -firms and    
  the optimal offer 
provided by   firms; then we have    
     
 . 
Proposition 1 simplifies the subsequent analysis substantially.
8
 As    
     
 , equations (1b) and 
(3b) can be rewritten for   in    and    firms separately. Specifically, the Bellman equation for    
workers working in   firms is reduced to: 
      
         
      
                 
      
       
     
  
     
  
      
   
 
   
      
   
  
        (5) 
For those working in   firms the Bellman equation becomes: 
      
         
      
              
    
      
     
                     
      
       
     
  
    
  
      
   
 
   
      
   
  
                                                       (6)                                                                                                   
Similarly, survival probabilities of   workers who are employed by   firms and   firms change from 3(b) 
to: 
                                                            
8 Burdett and Coles (2010) prove that offer values can be ranked according to the productivity level of firms. 
Consider the market of   workers only, if we think the marginal productivity of   firms as     and   firms as  , 
proposition 3.2 here is implied by their result. 
11 
 
       
                        
         
     
 
 
                                       (7) 
       
                                
         
        
 
 
                          (8) 
This makes disentanglement of the sub-problems for   workers in   and   firms possible. The 
following proposition describes the equilibrium outcomes in the labor market. The crucial step in the 
proof is to define   
      and   
      to replace       . Let   
            
    
   be the proportion of 
  workers who have an expected lifetime value no greater than    in all   workers excluding those 
working in   firms and   
            
    
   be the proportion of   workers with expected lifetime 
value no greater than    in all  -workers. Then, the proof of the equilibrium outcomes could fit nicely in 
that of Burdett and Coles (2003). Moreover, through constructing the overall        from    
      and 
  
     , we show that the lower bound of the starting wage in  -firms is the upper limit of starting wages 
offered by   firms. The assumption of differentiable   
     is necessary to derive the equilibrium. 
Otherwise, a mass point exists in   
     at the extreme offer value and wages in  -firms can be smaller 
than wages in  -firms when the rank of offer values remains (Burdett and Coles 2010). Detailed proof 
refers to the appendix. 
Proposition 2:  
(1) Given         and      ,   
    ,   
     are increasing and continuously differentiable, there 
exists a unique market equilibrium. At the steady state equilibrium, the baseline salary scale for worker   
satisfies: 
                                                    
    
    
  
 
   
 
 
                                                                    (9) 
                                                              
     
 
 
       
    
  
  
                                                   (10) 
The optimal wage-tenure contract for worker   follows the dynamic path: 
                                                   
   
  
 
       
      
 
       
            
  
  
                                                          (11) 
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For worker  , the baseline salary scale satisfies: 
                                           
    
   
     
   
  
         
          
 
 
                                                                     (12) 
                                              
        
     
   
 
 
       
      
  
 
  
                                                       (13)    
                                            
    
                                                                                   (14) 
                                           
    
 
    
   
 
         
                                                                       (15) 
And the dynamics of baseline salaries are:  
                                          
   
 
  
 
                
    
     
  
 
       
      
           
  
 
  
                                    (16) 
                                               
   
 
  
 
      
  
     
  
 
       
      
       
  
 
  
                                                (17) 
(2) At equilibrium, the earnings distributions are given by: 
                                                     
     
 
 
  
    
   
                                                                    (18) 
                                           
     
 
 
 
 
  
       
  
    
   
     
                            
    
  
         
       
     
 
   
 
 
       
                
    
  
              (19) 
And the unemployment rates of each type of workers are:  
                                                      
 
   
                                                                               (20) 
                                              
 
          
                                                      (21) 
The maximized total profits earned by a   firm and a   firm are:  
                                                      
    
 
          
    
   
           
                         (22) 
                                                               
    
 
    
    
 
 
                                                    (23) 
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Baseline salary scale is a succinct way to describe all the equilibrium solutions. For any starting 
value    from the support of offer distribution   , there exists a point    such that          ) where the 
subscript   denotes baseline. So the wage-tenure contract with a starting value    can be expressed as 
                  ; that is, any equilibrium wage-tenure contract can be found on the baseline salary 
scale starting with a specific point   . In this paper, we suppress the  -subscript for simplicity of 
presentation. The optimal decision implied in the proposition 2(1) is: for worker  , a firm can set any 
wage between         as the starting wage offer and backload it as described in the optimal wage-tenure 
dynamic (11); the total profit from   will be the same across firms no matter which wage-tenure contract 
they choose. Since 
   
  
 is positive, the optimal wage increases with tenure and the upper limit of the 
increment is   . Obviously, the wage support for type   workers can be solved by combining (9) and 
(10), from which the earnings distribution (18) can be derived.  
Similarly, for worker  ,   firms can set any starting wage between    
    
   and then backload 
the wage using the rule described in (16). Profit from type    workers is the same across the 
discriminating firms.  -firms can determine any starting wage between    
    
  , increase the wage with 
tenure as described in (17) and make the same profit as any other   firms. One point to note is that 
although   
    
 ,   
    
 . Rather, employees hired in   firms with a payment   
  have a higher 
expected lifetime value than the high-earners in   firms, i.e.,   
    
 ; because workers with   
  can 
expect an immediate increase in the payment while those approaching   
  cannot.  
Second, from the expression of unemployment rate (21), we can see that disutility   has no effect 
on   ; it is always higher than   ’s unemployment rate given in (20) as long as there is discrimination in 
the labor market (    ). If any of the two indicators equals zero, there would be no discriminating 
firms in the labor market. 
Third, from (22) and (23), it is easy to get the difference in profits in    and    firms:   
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                                                   (24)          
This is a general finding in the discrimination literature. Though   firms earn higher profit from a 
single   worker by paying a lower wage, the total profit is less than that in   firms; because the negative 
effect of lower employment and higher quit rate in a   firm outweighs the positive effect of a lower wage. 
Besides, the disutility taste   firms have towards   workers widens the profit gap further. The larger 
      and   is, the larger the gap.9 This indicates that having more minority workers in the labor market 
places the discriminating firms in a worse situation; and, the more prejudiced the discriminating firms are, 
the higher loss they will bear. 
4 Equilibrium Properties 
 
To facilitate the comparisons of average wages between two types of workers, we calculate the mean 
wages from (9), (12), (14), (15), (18) and (19), which gives 
         
    
  
  
       
           
 
 
        
  
    
                                                                                                      (25) 
         
    
  
 
  
   
          
  
 
       
   
    
   
 
    
 
       
         
     
     
                
 
     
         (26) 
Note that the unemployed workers are not included in the calculation.  
Under some general conditions, we discuss the equilibrium properties in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3 If   
 
 
     , 
     
  
     
  
 
 
   
 and 
   
 
  
 
       
  
         
 where   
          
         
  is the relative 
hazard rate, then the equilibrium has the following properties: 
(1) 
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
   
                                                            
9
Though values of   and   also influence   
  in the expression of profit difference, the negative correlation between 
    and   
  (which to be shown in section 4) will enhance the positive relationship between     and the profit gap. 
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(2) 
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
   
(3) 
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
      
   
 
  
   
(4)       
      
     
(5)         when discriminating firms only hire   workers (i.e.,     and     ) 
The discriminating wage bounds solved from equations (12) and (13) and non-discriminating wage 
bounds solved from equations (14) and (15) are functions of productivity  , unemployment insurance  , 
birth-death rate   , normal offer arrival rate   and three discrimination indicators       ). Under 
conditions specified in proposition 3, the comparative statics of wage bounds with respect to the three 
discrimination associated parameters, described in properties (1)-(3), can be easily obtained. 
Property (1) shows that the higher the proportion of  -firms in the market, the wider the range of 
discriminating wages will be; and the range extends in both directions. On the contrary, the degree of 
recruiting discrimination has an opposite effect: severe discrimination in the hiring process will lead to a 
narrowing of the discriminating wage range which converges to the unemployment insurance (which is 
implied by property (4)). Disutility has the same effect on discriminating wage bounds. Finally, the 
highest non-discriminating wage decreases as any of the three parameters increases.  
The next two properties compare the equilibrium wages between two types of workers. Several 
points are noteworthy. First, the lowest acceptable wage is lower than the unemployment insurance, 
which is a unique result within the search model with wage-tenure contracts. In Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998), firms set a constant wage rather than a wage-tenure contract, hence the lowest acceptable wage is 
the unemployment insurance   (when the offer arrival rate is the same for both the employed and the 
unemployed). Under the wage-tenure framework, however, workers are willing to work at a wage lower 
than the unemployment insurance only because they can expect an immediate increase in the payment. In 
fact, the expected lifetime value at the lowest wage is virtually equal to that at the status of unemployment.  
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Second,  ’s lowest acceptable starting wage is less than the lowest starting wage for  . This is 
because on the one hand, worker  ’s wage increases with tenure more quickly than  ’s; on the other hand, 
compared to  ,   is more likely to get a new and better job offer in the labor market.  
Third, that the upper bound of  ’s wages being higher than their counterpart’s is within expectation, 
since discriminating firms are unlikely to set too high a wage due to their disutility tastes. 
In a special case where discriminating firms hire only type  , property (5) shows that “minority 
workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination” (Black, 1995). However, this 
finding cannot be generalized. In the numerical example, we will show that if  -firms can hire   
(     ), the average worker   might be able to earn a slightly higher wage than worker  .  
5. A special case 
In this section, a special case of the CRRA utility function:      
    
   
 (   ) is considered. 
Tractable equilibrium solutions that are derived from proposition 2 can shed more light on the labor 
market with discrimination. Proposition 4 below summarizes the equilibrium results in this special case.  
Proposition 4: Given that both types of workers have the same CRRA utility function:      
    
   
 with 
   , the following statements hold: 
(1) The optimal strategy of a firm is to set fixed wages instead of the wage-tenure contracts, i.e., 
   
 
  
  .  
(2) The wage bounds are:  
                        
 
   
 
 
                         
  
                
    
       
         
          
 
 
        
  
     
 
         
 
 
   
 
          
 
 
         
And,     
      
    
    . 
(3)  ’s earnings distribution first order dominates  ’s earnings distribution, i.e.,   
    
  for all  .  
(4)         and the mean wage gap increases with       ). 
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b   
    
     
1 
As    , workers are infinitely risk averse; thus the optimal wage contract is constant wages. The 
equilibrium search model with wage-tenure contracts then degenerates to Burdett and Mortensen (1998) 
and the discriminating wage-tenure equilibrium search model degenerates to a simplified version of 
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002).10 Figure 1 describes the earnings distributions for both types of workers and 
apparently ’s cumulative earnings distribution first order dominates  ’s distribution. From first order 
dominance, property (4) is directly obtained. In addition, the same reservation wages between   and   is 
resulted from the assumption that the offer arrival rate is invariant between the employed and unemployed 
workers. The upper wage limit of   is less than that of   because of the existence of the three non-zero 
discrimination parameters       ). 
Figure 1: Earnings distributions 
------------ type   worker                    --------- type   worker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Moreover, the larger        ) is, the smaller  ’s average wage is. Since       ) does not enter 
type   worker’s wage, the average wage gap increases as       ) increases. This conclusion is in line 
with the empirical findings. For example, Charles and Guryan (2008) plot the black-white wage gap 
                                                            
10 Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) extend Burdett and Mortensen (1998)’s model to discuss the contributions of 
discrimination and skill differences to the wage gaps. In their paper, the offer arrival rate is assumed to be different 
between the employed and the unemployed and therefore unlike what we get in this special case, the reservation 
wage is larger than the unemployment compensation    
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against prejudicial attitude and find a wider gap at regions where many people will not vote for the black 
candidate for presidency or are against interracial marriages. 
6 A  Numerical Example 
As mentioned in section 4, it is interesting to examine the effect of the three discrimination-relevant 
parameters on the difference in the mean wages between type   and   workers. We assume in the section 
that all workers have the same CRRA utility function. Let                     and        . If 
the coefficients of relative risk aversion are         and    , equation (25) gives that  ’s average wages 
are 273.3307, 275.3025 and 276.8115 respectively. It seems that the more risk averse workers are, the 
higher the average wage they would earn.  
For worker  , we vary the values of       ) to see how the mean wage changes accordingly. 
Results are presented in table 1 in which the first panel fixes   and  , and changes the measure of 
discriminating firms  ; the second panel changes the recruiting discrimination   and keeps the other two 
measures unchanged; and the third one modifies disutility taste   given certain values of   and  . The 
findings are as follows: First, the mean wage of type   worker decreases in   and  , but increases in   
while the relationship with   is uncertain. Second, the fraction of  -firms plays a key role in the average 
wage; the other three parameters, though matter to some extent, have only limited influence on the wage 
outcomes. Third, if only  -firms exist in the labor market (see the case     in Panel 1), the wage gap is 
very large; however, the gap will drop dramatically when  -firms begin to appear. In addition, Panel (2) 
indicates that the wage gap does not change much even when  -firms are forbidden to discriminate in 
hiring (see    ); on the other hand, what appears to be against expectation is that severe discrimination 
in recruitment leads to higher average wage for   and hence smaller wage gap (see      ). However, 
one should realize that this does not mean type   workers are better off because only a few will be hired 
in this situation and the overall welfare of type   workers is in fact jeopardized. Finally, compared to  ’s 
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average wage, the numbers in Table 1 are almost consistently smaller, which accords with the common 
sense that discriminated workers have lower average wage.11  
Table 1: The mean wage of type   workers 
(1)              
                   
      276.6618 276.7661 276.8648 
      269.3880 269.9290 270.3657 
      258.4842 259.7430 260.6239 
      238.7852 240.6891 241.9693 
   .0 196.9306 199.2000 200.7968 
 
(2)             
                   
   .0 264.9373 265.9374 266.6517 
      264.4216 265.2213 265.8328 
      264.4312 264.8563 265.2231 
      265.7274 265.7662 265.8044 
 
(3)              
                   
  10 269.3757 270.4330 271.2300 
     264.3334 264.9009 265.3683 
      259.9760 260.1040 260.2230 
 
Next, we discuss the difference in wage dynamics between the two types of workers. To be 
representative, we choose a most realistic case where                      and      and an 
extreme case in which  ’s mean wage exceeds that of type   worker (See Figure 2).12 
Figure 2: Wage Dynamics 
(a) Realistic case  
                                                            
11 One exception is when       in Panel 1,  ’s average wage is slightly larger than  ’s. These rare cases seem to 
imply that the fraction of discriminating firms has to be large enough to generate the result of minority workers 
earning less than majority workers on average. Becker (1971) gives the exact condition   should satisfy to derive the 
wage differential in the framework of competitive labor market. Aigner and Cain (1977) find a similar result in a 
group of low skilled workers, that discriminated-against workers have a higher average wage than their counterparts 
under the assumption of same mean productivity and different variances.  
12Given those values, the simulated average wages for   and   are 273.3307 and 229.4995 respectively, very close 
to 273.9 and 230.96 derived from real data (Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002). 
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(b) Extreme case 
 
There are several points worth noting. First, the slope of the wage-tenure contract is positive, 
meaning that the wage always increases with tenure. Second, for type   workers, the increase accelerates 
at the beginning, and slows down gradually; on the other hand, for type   workers the increasing rate 
drops from the very beginning. Besides, the slope of  ’s wage-tenure contract is, in general, larger than 
 ’s, especially in  -firms.  -firms, though owning no prejudice towards worker  , have less incentives 
to backload their wages as quickly as they do to worker   because there are fewer outside opportunities to 
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worker  . If, however, only a small number of firms discriminate against worker   so that they can still 
seek many job offers from non-discriminating firms, then the slope of wage-tenure contracts designed for 
  workers by  -firms can be very close to, or even exceed the wage increase rate of worker   (figure b). 
 
7. Application One: Racial wage discrimination 
One empirical difficulty in the discrimination literature is how to distinguish the unobserved productivity 
differences and discrimination in the residual wage gaps. Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) build a structural 
model they are able to identify due to the different impacts productivity differences and discrimination 
have on the earnings distribution. In this exercise, using the same data as Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and 
similar identification strategy, we estimate the structural parameters of the wage-tenure discrimination 
model, and compare how the inferences on the extent of productivity differences versus discrimination in 
explaining racial wage gaps differ between the two models. Table 2 is a summary of the data that is useful 
in the estimation; detailed data description refers to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). 
Table 2 Summary of NLSY Data for Male High School Graduates, 1985-1988 
 Whites Blacks Pooled 
Unemployment rate 0.077 0.157 0.089 
Unemployment duration in weeks 22.15 29.05 23.65 
Minimum weekly wage 118.18 120.39 118.18 
Maximum weekly wage 605.97 428.16 605.97 
Mean weekly wage 273.90 230.96 268.03 
 
7.1 Identification 
In the model section, we assume no differences between the two types of workers except the observable 
characteristic which in this exercise refers to race. Now, to match the empirical observations in data and 
distinguish productivity difference from discrimination that attribute to the wage gap, we allow for racial 
differences in productivity   and the death rate  . The wage and unemployment data is used for 
identification. The following illustrates the identification in the most general case where both productivity 
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difference and discrimination exist. Identification of the structural parameters in other cases is just 
straightforward.  
First, using the unemployment duration, rate of unemployment rate and wage bound of whites,  , 
   and    are identified, as                           
 
 
,    
  
     
 and the equilibrium condition 
     
     
   
 . 
Next,    and    are identifiable using blacks’ unemployment rate and duration of unemployment 
data as                           
 
        
 and    
  
           
. Note that hiring discrimination is 
key to matching the racial difference in unemployment duration and varying death rate is crucial in 
determining the different unemployment rates. 
Third, parameters associated with discrimination,       and   
 , and blacks productivity    are 
simultaneously identified from the system of equations: the estimated   , two equilibrium conditions 
     
   
        
  
          
           
 
 
 
     
     
 
  
  
          
  , the mean wage         
  
       
        
 
    
 
        
          
          
                 
  
          and the median wage   
   
 
               
  
           
 
 
               
        
                 
    
           
          
           
 
 
                                
        
                 
    
 . The estimation procedure 
is as follows: first, try the value of    as the estimate of    and get all other parameters through the 
system of equations but the median one; then, predict the median wage according to the median wage 
equation, if it approximates the empirical median wage, keep all the parameter estimates, if not, modify 
the estimate of     accordingly and redo all the above until the predicted median wage tallies with the 
empirical one. One can also compare the predicted and empirical value at any other quantile to determine 
the appropriate estimates of parameters.          
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7.2 Estimation 
We estimate the parameters in six versions from a simple case where there are no differences between 
whites and blacks towards a complete model with both productivity difference and discrimination. In the 
simplest scenario where        ;         and no discrimination present (         ) , 
parameters   and   are solved from the pooled unemployment duration and rate of unemployment. 
Productivity level   is then identified from the equilibrium condition 
   
   
  
 
   
 
 
 where   and   are 
replaced with 118.18 and 605.97 respectively. The assumptions and estimation results are presented in 
column (1) of Table 3. In scenarios (2) and (3), we calculate    and    using the separate unemployment 
rate and equilibrium condition by race instead. The productivity levels differ significantly between whites 
and blacks and       ratios are indeed smaller than mean wage ratio as predicted in Bowlus and Eckstein 
(2002). Varying   is important in explaining the unemployment rate differential in data.  
Scenario (4) begins to incorporate the assumption of discrimination by allowing for the disutility 
experienced by prejudiced firms from hiring blacks.   ,     and   
  are calculated simultaneously using 
two equilibrium conditions and the equations of mean and median wages for blacks. The disutility level is 
found to be 72.4% of the white productivity, and 81.2% of the firms are prejudiced against blacks. When 
the restriction on equal hiring rate is relaxed in scenario (5), 91.1% of firms in the labor market have a 
distaste of 70.6% of the white productivity and offer to hire blacks at a rate 26.1% lower than the offer 
rate to whites.13 The productivity of blacks is only 3% lower than their counterpart. In this estimation, the 
model can not only match the racial differences in unemployment rates but unemployment durations as 
well. Finally, we get the parameter estimates in the scenario of pure discrimination in column (6).The last 
row of Table 3 presents the estimate of   
  when there is discrimination present in the labor market.  
                                                            
13 These estimates are obtained to match the wage of blacks at 10% percentile. When the median is matched in the 
estimation, the result implies blacks are more productive than whites and 96.5% of firms are prejudiced with a 
distaste as high as 97.5% of the white productivity and an offer rate 24.6% lower to blacks (            
                           
         ).   
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Table 3 Parameter Estimates 
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     ; 
no 
discrimination; 
      
       
no 
discrimination; 
      
     ;  
no 
discrimination; 
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present (   ); 
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present; 
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present; 
      
  0.0423 0.0423 0.0423 0.0423 0.0451 0.0451 
   0.0041 0.0041 0.0035 0.0035 0.0038 0.0038 
   0.0041 0.0041 0.0079 0.0079 0.0064 0.0064 
   609.86 609.86 608.88 608.88 608.88 608.88 
   609.86 430.62 435.94 537.21 591.02 608.88 
  0 0 0 441 429.67 436.34 
  0 0 0 0 0.2608 0.2580 
  1 1 1 0.8122 0.9106 0.9206 
  
  - - - 99 158.65 169.41 
 
The earnings distributions predicted in the pure productivity difference (scenario (3)), pure 
discrimination (scenario (6)) and mixed cases (scenario (5)) are shown in Figure 3, which clearly 
demonstrates the distinguishing effects productivity difference versus discrimination have on the earnings 
distribution. Besides, the wage-tenure discrimination model also allows for the depiction of wage 
dynamics. Figure 4 shows how the wage increase varies between blacks and whites at each wage level. In 
the case of pure productivity difference, the two lines have a similar shape and the blue line lies above the 
red one, suggesting a higher wage increasing rate in whites compared to blacks at any wage level. In the 
case of pure discrimination, there is a striking gap between the blue line and the red line; moreover, the 
red line is discontinuous at the jump point. It indicates that discrimination is an influential factor in wage-
tenure contracts, and the presence of discrimination leads to a sharp decrease in the wage increasing rate 
for blacks in both discriminating and non-discriminating firms. Intuitively, although non-discriminating 
firms do not discriminate against blacks, they have incentives to offer a less attractive contract to blacks 
than otherwise as there is now less competition among firms to hire blacks and black workers will be 
willing to stay and accept the less attractive contract because of no better options outside. When there are 
both productivity difference and discrimination in the labor market, the line indicating the wage dynamic 
of blacks is a combination of the two effects.  
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Figure 3 Predicted earnings distributions 
(a) Pure productivity difference 
 
(b) Pure discrimination 
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(c) Mixed: both productivity difference and discrimination 
 
Figure 4 Predicted wage dynamics 
(a) Pure productivity difference 
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(b) Pure discrimination 
 
(c) Mixed: both productivity difference and discrimination 
 
7.3 Comparison 
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The estimation results of our model imply that for the high school male graduates in 1985-1988, the 
productivity of black workers is 3% less than that of whites; and 91.1% of firms in the labor market have 
a distaste against blacks that is as high as 70.6% of whites productivity. Besides, these firms offer to hire 
blacks at a rate 26.1% lower than the offer rate they send to whites. Compared with the results in Bowlus 
and Eckstein (2002), we come to the same conclusion regarding to the productivity differential between 
race. However, in our model, the fraction of discriminating firms in the labor market is higher, the 
disutility discriminating firms feel in hiring black workers is stronger, while the recruiting discrimination 
is not as severe as that predicted in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). We speculate, the reason may be that 
there are so many firms that have a strong prejudice towards blacks that it turns out to be costly to have 
such a distaste and profitable by relaxing the discrimination a little during recruitment.  
One should notice a few differences between the wage-tenure discrimination model and Bowlus 
and Eckstein (2002) (BE henceforth). First and foremost, a constant wage is assumed in BE while our 
model assumes wage changes with tenure. Therefore, except for using mean wages in estimation, we also 
utilize wage ranges. Second, productivity is different in interpretation. BE interpret   as the average 
productivity level in a market with firm heterogeneity while   in our model is the marginal productivity a 
worker brings to the firm that not varying across firms. It implies that   must be greater than the 
maximum wage observed in the data. The estimated   in our model is thus much greater than those in BE. 
Third, offer arrival rates are different among employed and unemployed workers in BE but they are the 
same in our model and   is the destruction rate in BE but birth/death rate in our model. These 
simplifications help us focus on different effects productivity differential and discrimination have on the 
wage gap and their respective wage dynamics. Figure 5 depicts how wage increases with tenure when 
there are both productivity differential and discrimination in the labor market. Blue line represents the 
wage dynamic for whites, red line for blacks hired in discriminating firms and yellow line for blacks hired 
in non-discriminating firms. Obviously, the slope of blue line is greater than the slope of yellow line, 
which is greater than that of red line. It implies that white workers will experience a steeper wage increase 
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over tenure, followed by the black workers in non-discriminating firms. Black workers employed in 
discriminating firms have to search for opportunities in non-discriminating firms after around 50 weeks 
otherwise the wage will stagger and remain almost unchanged.   
Figure 5 Wage dynamics 
 
8. Application Two: Gender wage discrimination 
The second exercise is to estimate gender wage discrimination in the labor market. Besides, we will see 
how the predicted pattern of wage dynamics matches the empirical one.   
8.1 data 
The sample used is extracted from the NLSY79 for the period 1985-1987. To be included in our sample, 
an individual must be a white, either employed or unemployed in week 390, graduated from high school 
and not enrolled in further education in the period 1985-1987. For the unemployed worker, we calculate 
the unemployment duration. There are two versions of unemployment duration.       is the period that 
dated back from the week the unemployed worker began unemployed (no earlier than week 314 in year 
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1984) till the week he/she was either employed or out of labor force (no later than week 522  in year 
1987).       is the period that dated back from the week the unemployed worker began not employed 
(either unemployed or out of labor force, but no earlier than week 314 in year 1984) till the week he/she 
was employed (no later than week 522 in year 1987). Since       takes out-of-labor-force into the 
calculation of unemployment duration, it is greater than       which only counts the period 
unemployed.14 For the employed worker, we keep workers who have been employed all the time in 1985 
(week 367) -1986 (week 470), and calculate the increase in hourly wages. Table 4 summarizes the 
statistics that are useful in the estimation. Figure 6 plots the cdf and pdf of hourly wage for both genders. 
Table 4 Summary of NLSY Data for High School White Graduates, 1985-1987 
 Male Female Pooled 
Unemployment rate 4.314% 5.257% 4.749% 
      (weeks) 29.237 19.668 24.237 
      (weeks) 34.661 36.771 35.664 
Wage range (hourly pay) [41, 1923] [45, 1511] [41,1923] 
Average wage (hourly pay) 823.3616 634.6458 743.4436 
Median wage (hourly pay) 769 591 682 
 
Next, we explore the difference in patterns of wage increase between men and women. Figure 7 draws 
two scatter plots to show a rough relationship between wage increase and 1985 hourly wage, one is not 
weighted and the other weighted. It is found that points cluster in the lower middle part where hourly 
wage is between 250 and 1200 and wage increase is below 500; and, substantially more “male” points lie 
at higher wages. The predicted lines describe the trends of wage increase over levels. To compare the 
wage profiles of men and women more clearly, Figure 8 plots the magnitude of average wage increase 
over twenty or forty wage categories for male and female workers. Numbers on X-axis represent the 
middle point of each wage category. It is observed that women’s wage increase is almost consistently 
smaller than men’s wage increase. In addition, for both men and women, the magnitude of wage increase 
                                                            
14 Bowlus (1997) built a three stage model (employment, unemployment and nonparticipation) to study the role of 
gender differences in behavior patterns on wage differentials. Our model, however, only allows for two stages, i.e., 
employment and unemployment. Therefore, when applying it to gender labor market, “unemployment” refers to 
the status of unemployment or nonparticipation.    (real unemployment duration) and    (nonemployment 
duration) generate two groups of estimates that help us to compare the implications.     
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is much higher at low wages than at high wages. At very high wages (above 1600), only male workers are 
observed. In the next subsection, we will see whether our model is able to explain the regularities found in 
data, i.e., gender wage gap, differences in unemployment rate and unemployment duration and the 
patterns of wage increase. Since identification strategy is the same as specified in last exercise, we present 
the estimation results directly. 
Figure 6 Hourly wage distributions 
(a) Cumulative distribution function of hourly pay 
 
(b) Kernel density of hourly pay 
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Figure 7 Scatter plots of wage increase and hourly pay 
(a) Unweighted scatter plot 
 
(b) Weighted scatter plot 
 
Figure 8 Hourly Wage Increase 1986-1985 
(a) Over 40 categories 
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(b) Over 20 categories 
 
8.2 Estimation 
Table 5 reports the estimation results in three scenarios under two measures of unemployment duration. 
Assume no discrimination present in the labor market, the productivity of women is estimated 21% lower 
than men’s. 15  If discrimination is taken into account, the productivity gap shrinks to 3% of men’s 
productivity, smaller than 6.5% reported in Flabbi (2010) who uses the sample of white, college graduates 
                                                            
15 Using a search model that does not allow for discrimination, Bowlus (1997) finds the average productivity 
differential between male and female college graduates is 17.1% and 25.3% for high school graduates.   
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from CPS 1995. Looking at the estimates of discrimination parameters, one can find   is negative under 
     , suggesting offer goes to women more frequently. This is completely opposite to our expectation 
and problematic. As a matter of fact, compared to men, women are more often ending the status of 
unemployment by not participating in the labor market rather than finding a job. Therefore, it results in a 
seemingly lower unemployment duration among female unemployed than male unemployed, when it is 
measured by      .      , on the other hand, avoids this problem and is more appropriate in the 
situation of male-female discrimination. Indicated in column (5), when there is no productivity difference 
between men and women and all gender wage gap is attributable to discrimination, about 94.3% of the 
firms are prejudiced against women, with a distaste as high as 94% of the productivity, and search for 
female workers 6% less intensively than for male. If there are both productivity differential and 
discrimination, it is estimated that fewer firms (93.2%) have a slightly stronger distaste (96%) and 
stronger recruiting discrimination (6.1%) against women. Our estimate of fraction of discriminating firms 
is higher than 52% in Flabbi (2010) and 56% in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). 
Table 5 Parameter Estimates 
             
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     ;  
no 
discrimination; 
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present;  
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present;  
      
     ;  
no 
discrimination;  
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present;  
      
     ; 
discrimination 
present;  
      
  0.0413 0.0342 0.0342 0.0280 0.0289 0.0289 
   0.0019 0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 
   0.0023 0.0028 0.0028 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 
   1926.5 1926.50 1926.5 1926.5 1926.5 1926.5 
   1515.1 1926.50 1863.4 1515.1 1926.5 1863.4 
  0 1801.6 1851.2 0 1801.6 1851.2 
  0 -0.5342 -0.5445 0 0.0608 0.0615 
  1 0.9107 0.8935 1 0.9434 0.9324 
  
  - 123.91 12.638 - 123.91 12.638 
 
How well does our model match the empirical wage dynamics? Using the estimates in column (6) of 
Table 5, we plot the theoretical pattern of wage increases for both men and women in Figure 9, which 
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also shows a greater wage increase among male workers than female workers and a steeper increase in the 
lower wages as in Figure 7 and Figure 8, although the magnitude of wage increase differs. 
Figure 9 Predicted wage increase 
 
9. Conclusions 
This paper develops a discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts and predicts: 1) minority 
workers have a higher unemployment rate and a longer duration of unemployment; 2) non-discriminating 
firms make higher profits than discriminating firms; 3) the lowest acceptable wage for a minority worker 
is greater than that for a majority worker while the highest expectable wage of a minority worker is lower; 
4) generally, minority workers earn less than majority workers on average, and their wage increases more 
slowly than their counterpart. Moreover, we also show how the fraction of discriminating firms, distaste 
and recruiting discrimination affect the wage ranges and mean wages for both types of workers.   
Applying the model to data in 1985-1988 from NLSY79, we investigate race/gender 
discrimination in the labor market. Productivity differences between blacks and whites are estimated to be 
3% of whites productivity; productivity differences between men and women are estimated to be 3% of 
male productivity. 91% of firms possess prejudice towards black workers and 93% towards female 
workers. The distaste they hold toward blacks is about 70% of whites productivity and that towards 
women is 95% of male productivity. Compared to estimates in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi 
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(2010), we got similar results on productivity differences, but much higher estimation on discrimination. 
In addition, the predicted patterns of wage increase and that from data seem to exhibit some common 
characteristics. First, wage increases faster for men than women; second, wage increases faster at low 
wages than high wages. 
There are some limitations in the discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts. First, it 
does not consider the status of nonparticipation and other characteristics of jobs but wages in the labor 
market. This is crucial in comparing gender differences in labor market outcomes. Bowlus (1997) shows 
women have a greater tendency to exit jobs to nonparticipation due to family, pregnancy or health issues. 
Flabbi and Moro (2010) measure women’s preference for work flexibility and find an impact on wage 
distributions. The second limitation of the model exists in the empirical application. We follow the 
identification strategy in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) but it would be better if we can generate an 
econometric approach from the model and do some robustness check. Finally, we suggest some future 
researches on this line. One can study taste discrimination in the directed search model with wage-tenure 
contract (Shi, 2009) and see what different predictions can be obtained. Or, it may be modified to some 
extent to explain glass ceiling/sticky floor effects found in empirical work.   
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Appendix 
A1. Proof of proposition 1 
Since    
  and    
  are offers chosen by  -and  -firms to maximize their respective profit flow at 
the steady state, it implies 
       
            
        
     
 
 
          
            
        
     
 
 
   
and 
            
            
        
       
 
 
   
                                           
            
        
       
 
 
     
Note that   
   (     ) is the wage-tenure contract designed to deliver the offer, so it’s a function of 
   
 . The two inequalities then imply: 
       
            
        
     
 
 
         
            
        
       
 
 
    
          
            
        
     
 
 
         
            
        
       
 
 
     
If we define:  
    
         
           
 
 
    
Then the above inequality is: 
     
        
     
Because, 
     
    
      
  
   
          
 
 
         
   
           
   
   
 
 
    
due to the increasing property of      
   and          with respect to   
 , we have    
     
 . 
 
A2. Proof of proposition 2 
For the derivation of equilibrium results for worker  , refer to Burdett and Coles (2003). Below is a 
similar derivation of equilibrium results for worker  . 
(1) First consider the optimal wage-tenure contract designed for  -workers by discriminating firms.  
Given the starting offer   , the wage-tenure function solves: 
                 
        
       
 
 
    
where                                         
    
                           (A1) 
               
  =    
      
                
    
                
     
    
  
    
  
        (A2) 
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with starting values                                                 
         
To solve the dynamic optimization problem, define the Hamiltonian: 
         
                                
    
        
                               
      
                
    
                
     
    
  
    
  
    
Where       are costate variables with respect to    and   
    
The necessary conditions are: 
                                               =        
    
                                                                  (A3) 
                      
                                
    
                 (A4)        
                                   
                
     
                (A5) 
And the two differential equations    and   
  should satisfy (A1), (A2). 
Integrate (A4) with the integrating factor    yields: 
             
        
       
 
 
       
Define the expected future profit flow from tenure period   onwards as: 
  
      
     
       
   
       
   
     
       
 
 
    
Then, 
     
      
    
  
       
   
  
Since it’s an autonomous control problem, the optimized Hamiltonian is zero, i.e.,    . 
Substituting       in   out yields: 
       
           
      
    
  
       
   
                       
    
      
   
 
     
     
    
      
                
    
                
     
    
  
    
  
    
Therefore,    has to be zero to make   
  bounded. Thus       
      
    and (A4) turns to be              
    
   
      
   
  
       
          
      
                         
    
           (A6) 
And (A2), (A6) and     give: 
                                                            
   
      
   
  
       
     
   
      
   
  
                                    (A7) 
 Integrating (A5) with the integrating factor 
 
  
  and substituting    with   
  yields: 
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 To Substitute    in (A3) using the above expression and differentiate with respect to  , we get: 
                                               
      
  
     
   
   
    
  
          
     
    
                        (A8) 
In addition, the transversality condition implies         
      
      
 . 
 
(2) Next, we present the equilibrium results in terms of baseline wage.  
If the solution to the above optimization problem with      
  is taken as the baseline, then for any 
starting offer       
    
   , there exists    such that   
         . So, the optimal wage contract 
of any firm and all the equilibrium solutions could be expressed in terms of the baseline. For example, 
  
          
        ,   
      
      
         and   
      
      
        .  Then, it’s 
easy to derive   
     
  and   
      
 . Further, from (A2) we can obtain   
  
    
            
 
        
 ; 
and from (A6), we get    
  
    
   
        
. 
Let    denote the unemployment rate,    denote the share of   workers employed in  -firms and    
the share employed in  -firms. The flow conditions imply  
                      ;    
                      ; 
                 
So, the unemployment rate is    
 
          
 . 
And the employment rate of type   workers in  -firms and  -firms are:  
   
        
                       
;           
      
         
 
Let   
            
    
   be the proportion of   workers who have an expected lifetime value no 
greater than    in all the   workers excluding those working in  -firms. Then   
      is the 
corresponding baseline expression which satisfies: 
                                                              
      
  
     
 
         
          
                        (A9) 
and the flow condition for   workers employed in   firms with salary point greater than  : 
                             
       
   
     
  
   
                 
                         (A10) 
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As every  -firm makes the same profit from  -workers at the equilibrium, and   
    ,   
     
 , 
from the profit function: 
  
          
               
      
we can get   
       
      
    
   
        
. So, 
   
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
      
Then substituting out 
   
  
  
and 
   
  
  
 using (A6) and (A10) and combining it with (A10) yields:  
  
    
    
   
    
   
  
  
   
 
         
      
         
      
Putting the expression of    
   into (A9) thus gets, 
    
   
     
   
  
         
          
 
 
. 
The offer distribution could be derived from (A6), (A7), (A8) and the expression of   
  : 
                                 
   
         
       
  
    
   
    
   
   
 
      
  
 
       
      
           
  
 
  
             (A11) 
Further,   
          at the equilibrium.  
Since, 
   
     
  
          
   
which is derived from the baseline expression of (A2) at   
    
      and the Bellman equation for 
unemployed   workers; and,  
   
     
  
 =
     
   
 
 
       
      
  
 
  
  
which could be derived from substitutions using (A6), (A7), (A11) and the expression of   
  ; we can 
derive another relationship between the bounds of the support of discriminating wages, i.e., 
    
        
     
   
 
.    
Besides, the dynamics of baseline tenure-wages (equation (16)) could be easily derived from (A8), 
(A11) and   
   expression.  
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 (3) By the same token, we can get the equilibrium outcomes for   workers in the non-discriminating 
firms. Following the same procedures, we can prove that (17) holds. However, the support of the non-
discriminating wages is somewhat different in the derivation.  
Let   
            
    
   be the proportion of   workers (including the unemployed) who have an 
expected lifetime value no greater than   . Then, for the baseline expression, we have   
  
    
    
 
    
  . 
So, the overall proportion of type   workers (including the unemployed) who earn less than or equal 
to   at the steady state is:   
  
      
 
         
  
                              
    
  
  
                                               
    
  
    
Since   
    
     
    
   and   
    is monotonically increasing,   
 =  
 . Further, as   
      
 
         
, we can get: 
    
 
    
   
 
         
    
Thus, (14) (15) are proved. 
 
(4) Finally, we derive the earnings distribution of type   workers. 
Given   
   and   
  , the earning distributions of   workers in the  -and  - firms at the steady state 
are:  
  
   
     
  
   
      
  
     
   
And:  
  
   
 
  
   
               
So, the overall earning distribution is: 
  
      
  
     
  
                             
    
  
  
     
 
  
     
  
             
    
  
      
Substituting the expressions of   
  ,   
  ,       and    inside, gives equation (19).       
 
A3. Proof of Equations (22), (23) 
As shown above:  
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Similarly, 
  
     
         
         
    
 
 
 
Profits from   are: 
      
            
            
    
 
 
So,         
  and         
 . 
 
A4. Proof of proposition 3 
First, let’s consider properties (1)-(3). 
Taking partial derivatives of equation (13) with respect to       ) yields:  
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 <0. 
Similarly, partial differentiation of equation (12) gives: 
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where:  
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. 
Substituting them into the first group of equations thus proves: 
   
 
  
      
   
 
  
    
   
 
  
      
   
 
  
    
   
 
  
      
In addition, as     
    
   
 
  
 
        
 
      
              
     ,  when 
     
  
     
  
 
  
    
, 
we have 
   
 
  
    
Since   
    
 , the partial derivative with respect to       ) in (15) yields: 
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So, 
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 have the same sign as 
   
 
  
 and 
   
 
  
; and, 
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. 
Next, prove property (4). 
From (13) we get      
       . Thus,   
    because of the increasing property of     .   
To prove the other side, let’s assume   
   . The integrated variable hence satisfies   
    
  
   . So we have: 
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   and 
     
   
 
 
       
      
  
 
  
  
         
   which violates equation (13). Therefore, the assumption is false and we have proved 
  
    if   
 
 
     . 
Besides, the wage bounds of worker   can be seen as a special case of worker  ’s where       
  and    . From properties (1)-(3), property (4) is easily derived, i.e.,      
  and      
 . 
As for property (5), if    , equation (26) is reduced to  
        
  
 
      
   
    
   
  
         
     
   
where   
  and   
  satisfy: 
    
        
     
 
 
 
       
    
  
 
  
       and        
    
 
    
   
 
         
  . 
The only difference in the system of equations compared with those for type   workers is the offer 
arrival rate, i.e.,     for type   while     for type  . 
Let   
 
         
, after some algebra the mean wage could be rewritten as: 
                    
From the system of equations about        , we can get: 
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>0. 
So, 
   
  
                           
  
  
 
             
     
  
      
 
 
           
 
                
where the last inequality holds due to:  
           
 
             
           
 
 
                
 
    
In addition, as   is increasing in  , we  get 
   
  
  . So the proposition is proved.  
 
A5. Proof of proposition 4 
 (1) and (2) can be directly derived from proposition 1 and proposition 2.  
     because  
     
         
 
          
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
       
         
          
 
 
  
 
         
 
 
    
 Next, consider the comparison of earning distributions.  
Since  
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we can get   
    
  for all  , i.e.,  ’s earnings distribution first-order stochastically dominantes  ’s 
earnings distribution. Therefore,          and   
    
 
.  
Through tedious calibration, we can get the comparative statics of        : 
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